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Abstract 
Using two nationally representative establishment data sets, this paper 
investigates collective bargaining coverage and firms’ choice of govern-
ance structures for the employment relationship in Britain and in (western 
and eastern) Germany. Both countries have experienced a substantial de-
cline in collective bargaining coverage in the last decades. While bargain-
ing coverage is generally lower in Britain, single-employer bargaining is 
relatively more important in Britain, whereas multi-employer collective 
bargaining clearly dominates in Germany. Econometric analyses show that 
more or less the same set of variables play a statistically significant role in 
explaining the structure of collective bargaining in both countries. These 
include establishment size, establishment age, foreign ownership, public 
sector affiliation and being a branch plant. 
 
 
 
The authors would like to thank Thorsten Schank for helpful comments 
and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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1 Introduction 
The extents to which companies and employees are covered by collective 
bargaining and the evolution of collective bargaining coverage over time 
have increasingly become the focus of attention of practitioners, policy-
makers and industrial relations research. Since collective bargaining cov-
erage reflects the extent to which establishments and/or employees have 
their terms and conditions of employment determined by collective 
agreements, it is an indicator of the practical relevance of collective self-
regulation of the labour market parties. Furthermore, to a certain degree 
this indicator also reflects the power of employers’ associations and unions 
as well as their capacity to shape the regulation of the employment rela-
tionship and the labour market. 
In his seminal analysis of the decentralisation of collective bargaining in a 
number of industrialised countries, Katz (1993: 19) stated that “there are 
few systematic quantitative data tracing the evolution of bargaining struc-
ture”. Since the early 1990s, several studies have provided data on the 
structure and coverage of collective bargaining for a number of countries 
(for recent data see Traxler and Behrens, 2002; Visser, 2003), and there 
have been some empirical analyses investigating the macro determinants 
of bargaining centralisation by means of cross-national comparisons (see 
Traxler, 1996; Traxler et al., 2001). Other research has analysed the de-
terminants of collective bargaining centralisation in the United States by 
using industry-level data (Greenberg 1966a, 1966b; Hendricks and Kahn, 
1982, 1984). In contrast, for a long time the micro determinants of em-
ployer demand for collective bargaining and of firms’ (as well as unions’) 
choice of governance structures for the employment relationship have re-
ceived less attention in empirical work (notable exceptions being Deaton 
and Beaumont, 1980; and Booth, 1989), which may have been partly due 
to a lack of suitable data on the company or establishment level. In recent 
years, however, a number of quantitative studies of this sort have been 
published for countries such as Germany (see, e.g., Kohaut and Schnabel, 
2003), France (Cahuc and Kramarz, 1997) and the UK (Zagelmeyer, 
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2004a), but there has been no attempt of a truly comparative analysis 
across countries.1
This paper tries to fill this research gap by examining the determinants of 
governance structures (i.e. the factors influencing firms’ choice of multi-
employer, single-employer or no collective bargaining) in Britain and Ger-
many using a common model. In both Britain and Germany, multi-
employer collective bargaining has been playing a leading role in the de-
termination of the terms and conditions of employment for most of the 
post-war period. While one distinguishing characteristic of German indus-
trial relations has been its "relative centralisation of collective bargaining 
and the coordinated policies of the bargaining parties at sectoral level" 
(Jacobi et al. 1998: 191), multi-employer bargaining dominated pay de-
termination for the British workforce in establishments with 25 or more 
employees until the mid 1980s (Brown et al. 2003: 199). 
Britain and Germany stand out among European countries in that both 
have been experiencing trends of decollectivisation and decentralisation of 
collective bargaining (although these processes started at different points 
in time, and decentralisation took a more organised route in Germany). In 
contrast, the prevailing trend in collective bargaining coverage in the EU 
has been stability (Traxler and Behrens, 2002). While it may be interest-
ing to directly analyse and compare the trends of decollectivisation and 
decentralisation in Britain and Germany (see the non-econometric ap-
proach by Zagelmeyer 2004b), the focus and approach of this paper is dif-
ferent: We investigate econometrically whether the same factors can ex-
plain the choice of governance structures by British and German firms and 
discuss what this implies for the future of collective bargaining coverage in 
both countries. 
In the next chapter, we first outline the legal framework and recent devel-
opments concerning collective bargaining in Britain and Germany. Then 
the incidence of collective bargaining in both countries is investigated, and 
some of the advantages and disadvantages of different governance struc-
tures of the employment relationship are discussed. After a brief summary 
of previous quantitative research, chapter 3 theoretically and empirically 
                                                
1 For a qualitative comparative analysis using case studies from Belgium, Germany,  
Italy and Britain, see Arrowsmith et al. (2003) and Marginson et al. (2003). 
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analyses the determinants of employer demand for collective bargaining in 
Britain and Germany. Similar models are estimated for both countries us-
ing representative data from the German IAB Establishment Panel and the 
British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS).2 The final chapter 
discusses the results from a comparative perspective and identifies issues 
for further research. 
2 Collective Bargaining in Britain and Germany: 
Legal Background, Recent Trends, and Inci-
dence 
2.1 Legal Background 
British industrial relations have been characterised by the tradition of vol-
untarism, which includes the preferences of the industrial relations actors 
– the employers, the unions, and the state – for the voluntary procedural 
and substantive regulation of the employment relationship, as well as a 
non-legalistic approach to collective bargaining (Edwards et al., 1992; 
Flanders, 1974; Gospel and Palmer, 1993: 155). In Britain, collective 
agreements may be written or unwritten. Without express reference in the 
individual labour contract, collective agreements are not legally binding 
and thus not enforceable at law. They are “binding in honour only” and 
depend for their ultimate enforcement on the sanctions available to the 
parties. Each union involved in the conclusion of collective agreements 
needs to be recognised by the employer for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining in a particular unit. 
Collective agreements may be reached at any level at which negotiations 
take place. Single-employer collective agreements are forged at estab-
lishment, company, divisional or corporate level. At shop floor level, a 
formal system of collective agreements may coexist with informal rules 
and agreements that are often referred to as custom and practice (Brown, 
1972). At the industry level, multi-employer collective bargaining may be 
                                                
2 The provision of the WERS dataset by the UK Data Archive, which is jointly funded by 
the University of Essex, the Economic and Social Research Council, and the Joint In-
formation Systems Committee, is gratefully acknowledged. The Workplace Industrial/ 
Employee Relations Surveys were jointly sponsored by the Department of Trade and 
Industry; the Department of Employment; the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS); the Economic and Social Research Council; and the Policy Studies In-
stitute. 
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conducted between employers' associations and trade unions or trade un-
ion confederations. Multi-employer collective agreements may cover in-
dustries as well as geographical localities or districts. 
The German system of industrial relations is characterized by the dual 
system of interest representation, its extensive juridification, encompass-
ing organisations on both sides of the labour market, and a system of re-
gional industry-level collective bargaining (Jacobi et al., 1998). A further 
distinguishing characteristic is the constitutionally protected principle of 
bargaining autonomy (Tarifautonomie) which describes the right of coali-
tions of employers and employees to regulate the working conditions with 
neither state intervention nor interference, and thus to determine the la-
bour market constitution autonomously. 
The social partners conclude legally valid and binding collective agree-
ments which may be interpreted as the expression of collective self-deter-
mination. Collective agreements are concluded either as multi-employer 
collective agreements at industry level (Verbandstarifverträge) or as sin-
gle-employer collective agreements at company level (Firmentarifver-
träge). Collective bargaining is mainly conducted at regional industry 
level, but is – in certain industries – also quite frequent at national or 
company level.3 Another form of collective agreement is the works agree-
ment (Betriebsvereinbarung), concluded between a firm and its works 
council within the legal framework of co-determination, but works agree-
ments may not contain provisions which are generally regulated by collec-
tive agreement (such as wages). However, a collective agreement can ex-
pressly permit the conclusion of works agreements to supplement it. 
2.2 Recent Developments 
For the period between World War I and the 1970s, Clegg (1972: 200) 
described the British system of collective bargaining "as a system of na-
tional bargaining, or, more precisely, of 'industry-wide' or 'industry' bar-
gaining", which was assumed to dominate the determination of the terms 
and conditions of employment in Britain. While the first signs of decen-
                                                
3 In contrast to the UK, collective agreements can be extended by government regula-
tion to all employers and employees in the industry, including those not represented in 
the original negotiations. For more information on the legal background in Germany, 
see Wiedemann (1999) and Schnabel (2003). 
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tralisation had already appeared in the immediate post-war period, when 
industry-level agreements became less important with the rise of local and 
shop-floor bargaining (Department of Employment, 1971), the Royal 
Commission (1968) reported that workplace bargaining was more impor-
tant than anyone had realised. After government attempts to formalise 
and stabilize collective bargaining within the framework of national in-
comes policies had failed, the significance of multi-employer collective 
bargaining continued to decline through the 1970s, although formal cov-
erage rates remained quite high (Brown and Terry, 1978). 
The period between 1979 and 1997 then saw a significant reorganisation 
of governance structures in Britain. Based on the Workplace Industrial/ 
Employee Relations Surveys, Zagelmeyer (2004a) estimates the coverage 
rates of different governance structures for British establishments. Be-
tween 1980 and 1998, the sector with individual regulation grew from 33 
to 68 per cent of all British establishments with 25 or more employees. 
While single-employer collective bargaining covered about 20 per cent of 
those establishments between 1980 and 1990, it declined to less than 15 
per cent in 1998. Multi-employer collective bargaining stood at about 47 
per cent of those establishments in 1980 and 1984, and then declined to 
32 per cent in 1990 and 18 per cent in 1998. 
For western Germany, it has long been assumed that regional industry-
wide bargaining is the most important form of collective bargaining. Al-
though no official statistics exist, it was traditionally estimated that collec-
tive bargaining would cover around 90 per cent of all employees (OECD, 
1994). First signs pointing towards decentralisation occurred with the e-
mergence of qualitative bargaining policy in the early 1970s, which aimed 
at improving working life and at protecting employees against the adverse 
effects of rationalisation and technological change. Industry agreements 
now included provision for the establishment of performance require-
ments, work organisation, and rest periods, the implementation of which 
were to be bargained over at establishment level. When unions in the 
metal and printing industries achieved their goal of reducing weekly 
working hours, they were able to do so only by permitting the flexibilisa-
tion of working time, which was to be implemented locally, for example by 
works agreements (Bispinck, 1999). 
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In the 1990s, increasing international competition, high unemployment 
and German unification considerably changed the scene for collective bar-
gaining. A trend which started earlier but took off in the 1990s was the 
conclusion of industry-wide collective agreements which included so-called 
“opening clauses”. These clauses delegate bargaining authority to lower 
levels, usually to the employer and the works council, in order to allow for 
deviations from the multi-employer agreement that may save jobs. Fol-
lowing unification, the transfer of the western German industrial relations 
and collective bargaining institutions to eastern Germany resulted in a 
number of frictions. Employers' associations and trade unions had and still 
have difficulties in organising and keeping members. A major challenge 
was the unions' goal of bringing eastern wages up to western levels, re-
gardless of productivity, which has induced many firms to drop out of the 
system. Consequently, the number of firms with company agreements 
more than doubled in the 1990s (see Bispinck, 1999; Hassel, 1999, 2002; 
Schnabel, 1998, 2003). 
Recent research based on the representative data of the IAB Establish-
ment Panel has shown that between 1995 and 2001 the coverage rate of 
multi-employer collective bargaining fell from 53 to 45 per cent of all 
western German establishments with one or more employees. Eastern 
German establishments reduced their coverage of multi-employer collec-
tive bargaining from 28 per cent in 1996 to 22 per cent in 2001. In a par-
allel way single-employer bargaining seems to have fallen in recent years 
while the sector with individual regulation has grown, but due to a change 
in the corresponding survey question these two developments cannot be 
traced over a longer period of time (Kohaut and Schnabel, 1999, 2003). 
2.3 Incidence of Collective Bargaining in Britain and 
Germany 
The availability of large-scale establishment level surveys in Britain and 
Germany makes it possible to estimate and compare bargaining coverage 
rates in both countries. For Britain, we use the Workplace Employee Rela-
tions Survey of 1998 (WERS98), a nationally representative survey of 
2,191 establishments with 10 or more employees. For Germany, data for 
the year 2000 are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel of the Institute 
for Employment Research of the Federal Labour Office. Each year this na-
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tionally representative panel surveys several thousand establishments 
with at least one employee covered by social insurance.4
Based on the weighted data of both representative datasets, Table 1 dis-
plays collective bargaining coverage rates for Britain in 1998 and Germany 
in 2000. Let us first turn to Britain. In 1998, 26.8 per cent of British es-
tablishments with 10 or more employees were covered by collective pay 
bargaining, with 11.7 per cent covered by single-employer collective bar-
gaining and 15.1 per cent covered by multi-employer collective bargain-
ing. As far as differences across establishment size categories are con-
cerned, single-employer collective bargaining coverage varied between 
7.5 per cent for establishments with 10 to 19 employees and 43.8 per 
cent for establishments with 1,000 and more employees. The respective 
figures for multi-employer collective bargaining coverage are 11.5 and 
33.3 per cent. For both categories of collective bargaining, coverage rates 
appear to be positively associated with establishment size. 
As far as Germany is concerned, Table 1 displays separate data for west-
ern and (post-communist) eastern Germany, since both regions differ 
quite considerable in terms of historical development and labour market 
conditions. In 2000, 48.1 per cent of western German establishments 
were covered by collective bargaining, with 2.7 per cent covered by sin-
gle-employer and 45.4 per cent covered by multi-employer collective bar-
gaining. In eastern Germany, 27.5 per cent of all establishments were 
covered by collective bargaining in 2000. 4.3 per cent of eastern German 
establishments were covered by single-employer collective bargaining and 
23.2 per cent were covered by multi-employer collective bargaining. A-
gain, as in Britain, coverage rates appear to be positively associated with 
establishment size in western as well as in eastern Germany.  
                                                
4 Details regarding these data sets are given in Cully et al. (1999) for the WERS98 and 
in Kölling (2000) for the IAB Establishment Panel. The two years 1998 and 2000 were 
chosen because 1998 represents the most recent information available for Britain, and 
2000 has the advantage that it is the year in which the IAB panel was substantially 
augmented, while it is still relatively close to the 1998 date for Britain. 
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Table 1: Bargaining coverage in Britain and Germany by establishment size (in per cent) 
Great Britain (1998) Western Germany (2000) Eastern Germany (2000) 
establishment size 
interval (number of 
employees) 
single-employer 
collective 
bargaining 
multi-employer 
collective 
bargaining 
single-employer 
collective 
bargaining 
multi-employer 
collective 
bargaining 
single-employer
collective 
bargaining 
multi-employer 
collective 
bargaining 
1–9 
10–19 
20–49 
50–99 
100–199 
200–499 
500–999 
1,000 and above 
n.a. 
 7.5 
10.3 
14.5 
20.9 
32.6 
41.7 
43.8 
n.a. 
11.5 
16.3 
15.6 
23.5 
19.1 
16.7 
33.3 
 2.0 
 3.1 
 4.7 
 8.8 
 8.2 
10.1 
12.9 
12.7 
40.9 
54.1 
59.7 
56.9 
64.8 
68.9 
78.4 
81.2 
 3.2 
 6.9 
 7.1 
11.6 
13.1 
17.3 
12.2 
16.9 
18.2 
33.0 
44.0 
48.1 
53.8 
56.6 
74.5 
77.0 
Average 11.7 15.1  2.7 45.4  4.3 23.2 
Average for estab-
lishments with 10 or 
more employees 
11.7 15.1 4.6 57.1  8.0 39.9 
Sources: WERS 98, IAB Establishment Panel 2000; own calculations based on weighted data. 
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In order to facilitate comparisons with the British data that cover only es-
tablishments with 10 or more employees, figures for a corresponding Ger-
man sample are presented in the last line of Table 1. They reinforce the 
impression that single-employer collective bargaining is relatively more 
important in Britain, whereas multi-employer collective bargaining clearly 
dominates in Germany. 
However, at this point it is important to note that the questions regarding 
the governance structures are different in the British and the German 
data. The question in WERS98 asked for the mode of pay-setting, includ-
ing collective bargaining levels, for different occupational groups. An es-
tablishment was coded to be subject to a particular collective bargaining 
level if at least one occupational group was subject to this structure. In 
case of different groups being under different collective bargaining, the 
highest (or most centralised) one was chosen. Thus, the question refers to 
pay determination only. In contrast, the German data relate to the ques-
tion of whether the establishment is subject to a multi-employer or single-
employer collective bargaining agreement, with no explicit reference to 
any specific regulation issue or occupational group. Although it seems 
plausible that the highest level of collective bargaining in Britain is similar 
to the highest level of pay determination, one could also argue that the 
limitation to the pay issue might be associated with an underestimation of 
the general level of collective bargaining coverage in Britain. 
2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Levels of 
Regulation 
The fact that some firms prefer single-employer collective bargaining, 
while others prefer multi-employer agreements to determine the terms 
and conditions of employment implies that various types of governance 
structure have specific advantages and disadvantages for the industrial 
relations actors. These as well as the various micro- and macroeconomic 
effects of different governance structure have been the focus of intensive 
research in economics, political science, and sociology (for example, Aidt 
and Tzannatos, 2002; Berthold and Fehn, 1996; Calmfors, 1993; 
Flanagan, 2003; Moene et al., 1993; OECD, 1997; Traxler et al., 2001). 
While there has been a considerable amount of research on the associa-
tion between the degree of centralisation of a national collective bargain-
ing system and macro-economic performance variables (Calmfors and 
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Driffill, 1988; OECD, 1997), only recently the focus of attention shifted to 
the analysis of the level of pay determination as an explicit decision by the 
company (Freeman and Gibbons, 1995; Lindbeck and Snower, 2001; 
Ramaswamy and Rowthorn, 1993; Zagelmeyer, 2004a). 
From the macro-economic perspective, one may assume that the (sup-
posedly negative) effects of collective agreements and wage rises on other 
employees, employers and tax payers are more likely to be internalised, 
the higher the degree of centralisation or coordination of the collective 
bargaining system. The reason is that the bargaining parties at central 
level cannot afford to neglect these negative side effects, for example un-
employment, since they fall back on themselves. On the other hand, cen-
tralised negotiations are not able to fully use the information, capabilities, 
and flexibility available at the decentralised local level. The more central-
ised the negotiations, the less likely will the associated bargaining out-
comes reflect the economic situation and the specific needs of individual 
establishments and companies, unless the central agreement provides 
sufficient scope for additional local bargaining. 
In contrast, decentralised solutions, either in form of single-employer col-
lective agreements or individual regulation, permit to tailor the agreement 
to the situation of the company or establishment. Establishment-specific 
problems and demands may more easily be taken into account. Since the 
determination of terms and conditions of employment may reflect regional 
and labour market related factors, decentralised regulation should provide 
for a differentiated wage structure and thus for an optimal use of em-
ployment opportunities. However, if the demands of a company’s work-
force are not only oriented at the local situation, but rather at the terms 
and conditions in other establishments or companies, this may lead to 
leapfrogging pay claims. If unions are organised above the company-level 
or employees (as insiders) have a sort of monopoly power to dictate 
wages, this may be associated with higher wage increases, supposedly 
shifting the costs to unemployed outsiders. Compared to a centralised col-
lective bargaining system, national policy makers thus may have difficul-
ties in steering macro-economic wage and price developments. 
From the perspective of the company, the transaction-cost saving function 
of collective agreements is an important element of any cost-benefit 
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analysis of different governance structures. By substituting collective ne-
gotiations for a large number of individual negotiations and by standardis-
ing the terms and conditions of employment, collective agreements may 
reduce the costs of negotiations as well as of regulation. This advantage is 
positively associated with the level of bargaining centralisation and the 
bargaining coverage. In addition, wages are largely taken out of competi-
tion by multi-employer bargaining, and the shift of industrial conflict to a 
regulation level above the company level reduces the danger that the 
working atmosphere at the establishment might be negatively affected by 
conflicts related to collective bargaining. 
In addition to transaction costs, power factors and employer considera-
tions of how to deal with organised labour may play an important role (Ar-
rowsmith et al., 2003). Unionised employers can pool their strength and 
prevent leapfrogging by bargaining at multi-employer level. In addition, 
employers may use multi-employer bargaining as a vehicle to prevent the 
unionization of their workforce or to minimize the power of the local un-
ion(s). The capacity to pool power collectively at multi-employer level in-
creases with the homogeneity of activities across firms, which also means 
that greater heterogeneity of activities across companies makes even tacit 
collusion between employers more difficult. Arrowsmith et al. (2003: 368) 
argue that intensive competition, which increases uncertainty and instabil-
ity and acts as pressure for localisation in transaction-cost terms, 
strengthens management's control over the employment relationship. It 
would further increase management's power to use “divide and rule” tac-
tics vis-à-vis the unions when it comes to internal investment decisions 
between production sites. 
With regard to employer preferences for a particular degree of centralisa-
tion of collective bargaining, Thörnqvist (1999) emphasises politico-
ideological motives related to the balance of power between capital and 
labour. Centralised systems would increase union power and, thus, em-
ployers would favour decentralised bargaining in order to secure the pre-
rogative of management and control over the employment relationship.5 
                                                
5 Thörnqvist (1999: 80) focuses on Sweden where he sees political and ideological 
changes as “of the utmost importance for understanding the decentralization process”. 
For a comprehensive and comparative discussion of the broader political context un-
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Traxler (2003: 2) argues that such an agency-centred perspective quali-
fies the relevance of performance (or efficiency) considerations, so that 
the latter just work “as a justification of an actor's preferred bargaining 
level in public discourses rather than as an economic imperative for a cer-
tain bargaining level.” Taking an intermediate position between the per-
formance argument and the ideology argument, Traxler (2003: 19) main-
tains that "extended managerial control may be seen [by the employers] 
as an end in itself or as a means of improving performance." 
As far as the optimal level of regulation is concerned, the various advan-
tages and disadvantages discussed above point to a potential trade-off 
between the company-level and the macro-economic perspective, imply-
ing that generally applicable and efficient solutions may be difficult to find. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the advantages and disadvantages of 
different regulation levels may change over time, which may then have an 
impact on the optimal level of regulation. 
The optimal level of regulation as well as collective bargaining coverage 
may be affected by macro-economic developments in various ways. On 
the one hand the degree of centralisation may increase, because (for 
Germany) the European Monetary Union requires a higher degree of 
nominal wage flexibility, and because it is often assumed that the coordi-
nation of collective bargaining will help achieve this better. On the other 
hand, the prevailing trend over the last decade has been a reduction in 
inflation rates, and consequently a reduction in the importance of central-
ised negotiations for achieving wage moderation. Increasing levels of un-
employment as well as the option of moving production abroad may make 
decentralised negotiations more attractive for companies, because they 
reduce insider power and improve the bargaining position of the employer. 
A very important challenge to collective bargaining policy and the choice 
of the optimal level of regulation may be seen in the increasing globalisa-
tion of the economy as well as in technological and structural change. 
Growing international competition and the increased speed of technologi-
cal change both increase the probability of shocks and changes in the ex-
                                                                                                                                                     
derpinning the organisation of interests and the operation of bargaining systems, see 
Traxler et al. (2001). 
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ternal environment which may affect regions, industries, companies, and 
occupational groups differently, and which may require differentiated re-
sponses. To the extent to which differences between sectors and estab-
lishments increase, the transaction-cost advantage of centralised ar-
rangements decreases in favour of the informational and flexibility advan-
tages of decentralised regulation. 
Globalisation is associated with the increasing importance of adaptation 
flexibility in face of changing conditions in the product and the factor mar-
kets. The structure of production moves away from standardised, Fordist 
mass production to differentiated high technology products. Consequently, 
work organisation needs to become more flexible. Against the background 
of these developments, there may be a shift from Taylorist work organisa-
tion to greater team orientation, fewer levels of hierarchy, increased indi-
vidual responsibilities and job enlargement. Consequently, investment in 
firm-specific human capital, employee participation, and performance-
related compensation are becoming more important in this post-Fordist 
environment. In such an environment that requires local and flexible deci-
sion-making, relatively rigid rules established by collective bargaining and 
a relatively small scope for decision-making with regard to compensation 
systems and other personnel policies may pose serious problems for many 
firms and might prompt them to drop out of the collective bargaining sys-
tem. 
Although a comprehensive theoretical model capable of explaining the de-
terminants of collective bargaining coverage does not yet exist, economic 
theory provides some starting points for the explanation of employer 
choice of a certain level of regulation. Some potential determinants will be 
analysed in the following section, drawing on the data of the Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey and the IAB Establishment Panel. 
3 Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Prior Empirical Research for Britain and Germany 
Despite a growing interest in the emergence and the change of govern-
ance structures, in particular concerning de-collectivisation, empirical re-
search on the determinants of collective bargaining coverage and the pre-
ferred level of regulation is still relatively small and has not resulted in an 
established set of consistent empirical findings (for an overview of re-
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search with nationally representative data, see Zagelmeyer, 2004b). Fur-
thermore, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have been conducted 
yet that cover more than one country. 
So far, there exist only three studies of collective bargaining centralisation 
in Britain. The first quantitative study by Deaton and Beaumont (1980) is 
based on survey data covering 970 manufacturing firms. It shows that, 
among others, regional concentration, labour costs, union density and 
multi-unionism are positively associated with centralisation, while there 
are negative associations for establishment size, foreign ownership and 
product market concentration. The other two studies are based on the 
Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations Surveys. Research by Booth 
(1989) shows that centralisation is negatively associated with establish-
ment/organisation size and foreign ownership, and positively associated 
with the share of labour costs in turnover. According to Zagelmeyer 
(2004a), the influence of several independent variables varies across 
years, so that their overall impact is not clear-cut.6
There is more research on the determinants of governance structures in 
Germany, and this is most comprehensive with regard to the alternative 
choices examined and quite heterogeneous with regard to explanatory de-
terminants included in the models. Despite differences in detail, analyses 
of the choice between decentralised regulation and multi-employer collec-
tive bargaining based on the representative IAB Establishment Panel (see, 
e.g., Bellmann et al., 1999; Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003; Lehmann, 2002) 
show that establishment size, establishment age, and being a subsidiary 
establishment of a multi-plant company are positively associated with 
multi-employer collective bargaining. Further research based on other 
data sets is mostly consistent with this evidence and points to additional 
determinants such as union density and the composition of the workforce 
                                                
6 In addition, there has been a considerable amount of research on the determinants of 
union recognition in Britain. Beaumont and Harris (1989, 1991) show that union rec-
ognition is positively associated with organisation and establishment size, establish-
ment age, the percentage of female employees, and the percentage of part-time 
employees, whereas it is negatively associated with the proportion of manual workers. 
Disney et al. (1995) and Machin (2000) demonstrate that union recognition is positi-
vely associated with establishment size, establishment age as well as public-sector 
and private-sector manufacturing establishments. According to these studies, union 
recognition is negatively associated with the percentage of part-time employees, fo-
reign ownership, and single-establishment companies. 
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(see, e.g., Franz and Pfeiffer, 2001; Lehmann, 2002; Hübler and Jirjahn, 
2003). 
3.2 Potential Determinants of Collective Bargaining 
Structure 
Arguments regarding the determinants of collective bargaining coverage 
and bargaining centralisation range from macro-level determinants (for 
recent summaries, see Traxler et al., 2001; Zagelmeyer, 2004a) to micro-
level determinants (summarized by Lehmann, 2002; Zagelmeyer, 2004a). 
The present paper focuses on micro-level factors affecting the level of 
regulation of the employment relationship. This section summarises the 
theoretical arguments regarding these determinants, focusing on em-
ployer choice between three alternative options, namely individual regula-
tion, single-employer collective bargaining, and multi-employer collective 
bargaining.7 Then we estimate an econometric model for the probability 
that an establishment is associated with a certain governance structure. 
Since our data are only cross-sectional and do not provide information on 
all issues that may be of interest from a theoretical perspective, the fol-
lowing analysis is not so much an exact testing of hard-to-quantify eco-
nomic hypotheses, but should rather be seen as an attempt to empirically 
identify certain characteristics of establishments associated with different 
forms of governance structure. 
In addition to the descriptive evidence presented in Table 1 there are sev-
eral other reasons why company or establishment size may be expected 
to be positively associated with the centralisation of governance struc-
tures. As establishment or organisation size increases, organisational 
structures become more complex and personal relationships become more 
distant. Costs associated with co-ordination, monitoring and communica-
tion increase. Collective bargaining may reduce complexity, and improve 
communication. In addition, as transaction costs of concluding individual 
                                                
7 While we assume that the employer has the right to unilaterally determine the choice 
of the governance structure, this does not rule out that he may bargain with the un-
ion(s) over the collective bargaining structure and that power relations and institu-
tional factors (such as labour law, extension schemes, union organisation and 
strength, employers associations) may play a role here; these factors are stressed and 
investigated by Arrowsmith et al. (2003) and by Traxler et al. (2001). 
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contracts tend to increase with the number of employees, collective 
agreements may reduce transaction costs. 
The next argument is based on the idea that centralised collective bar-
gaining provides collective goods, for example, wage moderation. Large 
firms may benefit so much from membership in an employers’ association 
and from provision of the collective good multi-employer collective bar-
gaining that they disproportionately support the formation and mainte-
nance of employers’ associations and multi-employer collective bargaining 
arrangements (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003). One of the reasons why large 
and relatively profitable companies may benefit from multi-employer col-
lective bargaining is that the terms agreed would be oriented at the less 
profitable (and usually smaller) companies. Another factor that hints at a 
positive association between establishment or company size and collective 
bargaining is that there may be economies of scale for trade unions in 
terms of organisational activity. Larger establishments may thus be posi-
tively associated with unionisation, higher membership density and collec-
tive bargaining. 
On the other hand, larger organisations are more likely to experience in-
dustrial relations problems that are specific to them, and may want to ha-
ve the maximum possible freedom to deal with them (Beaumont et al., 
1980: 127) rather than delegating authority to the employers’ association. 
It may be argued that smaller companies have a greater need to improve 
their bargaining position by increasing their collective bargaining power 
via multi-employer collective bargaining than large employers do. In order 
to control for non-linearities, we therefore include the establishment size 
variable in linear and in squared form into the estimations. In addition, a 
branch plant dummy variable catches the effect that establishments in 
multi-plant organisations might be more likely to be covered by collective 
bargaining than independent establishments of similar size. 
Establishment age may also play a role for governance structures in that 
recently established businesses (start-ups) often require more flexible in-
stitutional arrangements at early stages of their existence in order to sur-
vive and be successful. In addition, there may be institutional inertia, 
which could lead to some sort of path-dependency. Companies that have 
benefited from multi-employer bargaining in the past when it was the pre-
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prevalent governance structure may retain this arrangement because they 
have positive expectations about its problem-solving capacity. Limitations 
in the German data set force us to restrict establishment age to a dummy 
variable taking on the value of 1 if the establishment is not more than five 
years old, and we expect a negative influence of this variable for the rea-
sons mentioned above. 
As far as the association between governance structure and employment 
structures is concerned, there exist alternative hypotheses. Homogeneity 
of the workforce may be positively associated with demand for collective 
regulation, as there should be benefits from standardisation. In contrast 
to establishments with highly skilled employees, whose terms and condi-
tions of employment can best be regulated by individual employment con-
tracts, establishments with a large share of low-skilled employees may be 
more likely to be covered by collective agreements. On the other hand 
there is the argument that employees and workers without any qualifica-
tions or with very low levels of skills have lower propensities to unionise 
and to handle their employment relationships collectively. The lower levels 
of firm-specific human capital of such employees also imply that there is 
less demand for collective regulation on the employer side, since the costs 
of opportunistic behaviour (and of substituting these workers) that could 
be reduced by collective regulation and the union monitoring function are 
lower for these workers. In this case one may expect the percentage of 
low-skilled workers to be negatively associated with collective bargaining. 
It may also be interesting to see how ownership of the company influ-
ences the choice among governance structures, although there exist al-
most no clear-cut theoretical hypotheses. It could be argued that foreign 
ownership is negatively associated with collective bargaining since the 
management of establishments controlled by foreign multinationals may 
require different institutional settings compared to other establishments. 
In other words, multinationals may develop their own company-specific or 
concern-specific employment system which is incompatible with the pre-
dominant industrial relations institutions in the host country. Also, man-
agement at foreign-controlled establishments might copy the supposedly 
successful institutional and organisational configuration of the establish-
ments existing in their country of origin. Unfortunately we cannot test the 
latter hypothesis due to lack of data on the country of the foreign owner, 
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but we will investigate with a dummy variable whether establishments 
that are predominantly foreign owned are more or less likely to rely on 
collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, our estimations control for public sector affiliation of the es-
tablishment. While the general behavioural assumption for private-sector 
firms in capitalist economies is profit-maximization, public sector estab-
lishments may follow different objectives. Beaumont and Gregory (1980: 
47) argue that public sector employers may encourage union organisation 
and collective bargaining in order to improve staff relations and service. 
Thus, one may expect public sector affiliation to be positively associated 
with collective bargaining. Moreover, since public sector establishments, in 
particular in public administration, have similar structures across the 
country, there may be benefits from standardizing employment conditions 
via multi-employer collective bargaining. 
Finally, there may be industry specific factors, such as the level of collec-
tively agreed wages and the quality of the employers' association, which 
may have an impact on collective bargaining coverage. This is (imper-
fectly) captured by including a set of industry dummy variables indicating 
the sectoral affiliation of the main economic activity of the establishment. 
3.3 Empirical Results 
In our empirical analysis we make use of an ordered probit model that es-
timates the probability of choosing one of the three alternative options, 
namely individual regulation (i.e. no collective bargaining), single-
employer collective bargaining, and multi-employer collective bargaining. 
We thus assume that the dependent variable can be interpreted as an or-
dered categorical variable, and this for at least two reasons: Following the 
transaction cost arguments outlined above, the probability of choosing a 
specific governance structure increases from individual regulation over 
single-employer collective bargaining to multi-employer collective bargain-
ing. This is because the employer may reduce transaction costs by moving 
from individual contracting to standardised single-employer agreements, 
and transaction costs fall further if employers associations can deliver col-
lective agreements at even lower cost and with additional advantages due 
to specialisation effects, reduced risk of industrial action, sectoral stan-
dardisation of wages etc. In contrast, under the aspects of flexibility and 
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differentiation, firms’ probability of choosing a specific governance struc-
ture should fall in this order (with individual contracts offering the greatest 
and multi-employer arrangements the smallest flexibility and differentia-
tion). Since both perspectives imply the same order (albeit with different 
justifications and underpinnings), an ordered probit estimation is feasible 
(for details, see Greene, 2000: 875ff.).8
Our empirical results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 in the form of mar-
ginal effects (reflecting the effects of a one-unit change in a continuous 
explanatory variable at its mean or of a discrete change of a dummy vari-
able from 0 to 1 with all other variables set at their sample means). The 
same models are applied to Great Britain and to western and eastern 
Germany.9 Definitions and descriptive statistics of the dependent and in-
dependent variables used in these estimations can be found in an Appen-
dix Table. The estimates show that almost all independent variables play a 
statistically significant role in explaining the structure of collective bar-
gaining, although their precise effects differ in Britain and Germany. 
Since interpreting the coefficients and marginal effects of ordered probit 
estimations is not obvious (for detailed explanations see Greene, 2000: 
876ff.), the public sector dummy variable will be interpreted first because 
it provides a good example for the similarities and differences among the 
three regions analysed. In accordance with expectations, establishments 
operating in the public sector are more likely to make use of collective 
bargaining and are less likely to have no collective bargaining than other 
establishments, ceteris paribus. This effect is very strong in Britain where 
belonging to the public sector lowers an establishment’s probability of no 
                                                
8 This is not to deny that alternative set-ups of employers’ choice are possible, all of 
which require specific assumptions and have different strengths and weaknesses that 
cannot be discussed in detail here. One could concentrate on the distinction between 
centralised (i.e. multi-employer) and decentralised (i.e. firm-level) arrangements, as 
analysed by Kohaut and Schnabel (2003) for Germany (whose results are very much 
in line with those presented here). Another binary choice might be between individual 
regulation and collective bargaining, as studied by Zagelmeyer (2004a) for Britain. 
Choices between our three categories might also be modelled sequentially as a two-
step process, or multinomial choice could be investigated (see Zagelmeyer 2004a). 
9 While the descriptive information on collective bargaining incidence displayed in  
Table 1 is based on weighted data, the econometric investigation uses unweighted 
data, and all models include the stratification variables of the representative surveys 
(i.e. industry dummies and establishment size); see Winship and Radbill (1994) for a 
discussion of these methodological issues. 
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collective bargaining by 56 percentage points while increasing the prob-
abilities of single- and multi-employer bargaining by 15 and 41 percentage 
points, respectively (see Table 2). In western and eastern Germany, the 
probability of multi-employer bargaining rises by only 13 and 21 percent-
age points, respectively, if an establishment operates in the public sector 
(see Table 3). 
Table 2: Determinants of collective bargaining structure in Great Britain (1998) 
(Ordered-probit estimates; dependent variable is an index of the type of  
collective bargaining; estimates shown are marginal effects) 
 
explanatory variables 
no collective 
bargaining 
single-employer
bargaining 
multi-employer 
bargaining 
establishment size    -0.0002**     0.0001**     0.0001** 
(number of employees)   (-6.27)    (5.86)    (6.20) 
establishment size squared     1.05 e-08**    -0.52 e-09**    -0.53 e-09** 
    (4.85)   (-4.64)   (-4.82) 
branch plant    -0.20**     0.11**     0.09** 
(dummy: 1 if yes)   (-6.50)    (5.48)    (7.63) 
establishment age     0.07*    -0.04*    -0.03* 
(dummy: 1 if ≤ 5 years)    (2.18)   (-2.05)   (-2.31) 
low-skilled employees     0.0003    -0.0001    -0.0002 
(percentage)    (0.69)   (-0.69)   (-0.69) 
foreign ownership/control     0.10**    -0.06**    -0.05** 
(dummy: 1 if yes)    (3.38)   (-3.08)   (-3.70) 
public sector    -0.56**     0.15**     0.41** 
(dummy: 1 if yes) (-18.37) (11.88) (12.42) 
industry dummies yes** yes** yes** 
n 
Pseudo R2 
    2,125 
    0.226 
    2,125 
    0.226 
    2,125 
    0.226 
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent z-values in parentheses; ** and * denote statistical significance  
at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 
Source: WERS 98; own estimations 
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Table 3: Determinants of collective bargaining structure in Germany (2000) 
(Ordered-probit estimates; dependent variable is an index of the type of collective bargaining; estimates shown are mar-
ginal effects) 
Western Germany Eastern Germany  
 
explanatory variables no collective bargaining 
single-employer
bargaining 
multi-employer 
bargaining 
no collective 
bargaining 
single-employer 
bargaining 
multi-employer 
bargaining 
establishment size    -0.0002**    -0.00001**     0.0002**    -0.0007**     0.00003**     0.0006** 
(number of employees)   (-5.58)   (-4.94)    (5.54) (-11.28)    (7.23) (11.15) 
establishment size squared     4.47 e-09**     3.40 e-10**    -4.81 e-09**    -1.25 e-07**    -5.85 e-09**    -1.19 e-07** 
    (5.38)    (4.93)   (-5.36)    (8.92)   (-6.41)   (-8.86) 
branch plant    -0.17**    -0.02**     0.19**    -0.22**    -0.005     0.22** 
(dummy: 1 if yes) (-15.41) (-11.03) (15.18) (-12.31)   (-0.30) (11.69) 
establishment age     0.14**     0.006**    -0.15**     0.12**    -0.009**    -0.11** 
(dummy: 1 if ≤ 5 years)    (7.19) (11.08)   (-7.43)    (6.38)   (-4.37)   (-6.56) 
low-skilled employees     0.0005*     0.00004*    -0.0005*     0.001**    -0.00004**    -0.001** 
(percentage)    (2.51)    (2.49)   (-2.51)    (2.94)   (-2.77)   (-2.94) 
foreign ownership/control     0.05*      0.003*    -0.05**    -0.16**    -0.001     0.16** 
(dummy: 1 if yes)    (2.01)     (2.45)   (-2.04)   (-3.67)   (-0.44)    (3.47) 
public sector    -0.12**    -0.01**     0.13**    -0.21**     0.001     0.21** 
(dummy: 1 if yes)   (-5.59)   (-4.37)    (5.46)   (-7.15)    (0.32)    (6.85) 
industry dummies yes** yes** yes** yes** yes** yes** 
n 
Pseudo R2 
    8,006 
    0.110 
    8,006 
    0.110 
    8,006 
    0.110 
    5,301 
    0.156 
    5,301 
    0.156 
    5,301 
    0.156 
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent z-values in parentheses; ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel 2000; own estimations 
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The probability of multi-employer bargaining also increases with the size 
of an establishment, but at a decreasing rate (indicated by the negative 
coefficient of the quadratic in establishment size). This effect is strongest 
in eastern Germany, where simulations show that increasing the size of an 
establishment from 100 to 200 employees increases its probability of 
multi-employer bargaining by 6 percentage points (whereas the respective 
effects are just 2 percentage points in western Germany and 1 percentage 
point in Britain). In both countries, branch plants are less likely to have no 
collective bargaining and are more likely subject to multi-employer bar-
gaining agreements than independent establishments, which may reflect a 
spill-over effect from their parent company. In contrast, newly-founded 
establishments are less likely to make use of multi-employer bargaining, 
probably because they require more flexible institutional arrangements at 
this early stage of their existence or because they have not been organ-
ised yet by trade unions and employers’ associations. In addition, industry 
effects play a significant role in explaining governance structure in both 
countries. 
The percentage of low-skilled employees in the workforce seems to be 
negatively related to multi-employer bargaining, but this effect is statisti-
cally significant in Germany only. Foreign ownership or control increases 
the probability of no collective bargaining by 10 percentage points in Brit-
ain and by 5 percentage points in western Germany, whereas it lowers 
this probability of individual regulation by 16 percentage points in eastern 
Germany.10
Despite these differences in detail, the broad picture is that more or less 
the same set of variables are associated with firms’ choice of governance 
structure for the employment relationship in Britain and in (western and 
eastern) Germany. Although the establishment size effect is much stron-
ger in eastern than in western Germany and the foreign ownership effect 
differs between both regions, we would not conclude from our regressions 
with micro data that the determinants of bargaining structure in eastern 
Germany are totally different from those in western Germany. Moreover, 
                                                
10 Kohaut and Schnabel (2003) found similar differences between western and eastern 
Germany in their probit analysis of multi-employer collective bargaining, but they also 
were not able to provide a simple and convincing explanation for this result. 
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Moreover, they do not more closely resemble those factors which shape 
the “disorganised decentralised” British system (as compared to the “or-
ganised decentralised” western German one), as might have been ex-
pected given the different tradition of and experience with collective bar-
gaining in eastern Germany. 
4 Conclusions 
While much of international and comparative research so far has made 
extensive use of qualitative data obtained through case studies, there are 
very few examples of comparative research based on company and estab-
lishment surveys. Whitfield et al. (1998: 193ff.) make the case for survey 
based comparisons by arguing that case studies could be complemented 
by such survey based research. They suggest that comparing establish-
ment surveys, if they have common questions and comparable sample 
populations, may lead to useful results in an informed international com-
parative analysis at the micro level, but they also warn that certain prob-
lems of incompatibility may occur. 
In this paper we have tried to identify major determinants of collective 
bargaining structure by comparing the results of two nationally represen-
tative establishment surveys for Britain and Germany. As the institutional 
framework in both countries differs and as the British data refer to estab-
lishments with 10 or more employees whereas the much larger German 
data set covers all establishments with at least one employee, our analy-
ses need to be interpreted with a pinch of salt. We also experienced a po-
tential problem of question incompatibility concerning the dependent vari-
able because the British data focus on pay determination, whereas the 
German data do not refer to a particular governance issue. Since also in 
Germany pay determination is the major issue in collective bargaining and 
can be said to determine the choice of governance structure, and since 
the dependent variable chosen is very broad, we think that incompatibility 
is not a serious problem of the present study. All in all, we feel that the 
data sets used and developed possess the characteristic of reasonably 
close comparability. 
This said, we must admit that the variables analysed represent a small 
subset of those available in both data sets, as well as a subset of those 
that would be ideal for a comprehensive comparative analysis. Feasibility 
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clearly dominated desirability.11 We also acknowledge that surveys and 
cross-sectional analyses tell us little about causal relationships and proc-
esses. However, they allow for more comprehensive testing than other 
approaches, and they enable us to present a broad picture and to identify 
some factors that are associated with firms’ choice of a certain level of col-
lective bargaining. Obviously our approach has to be complemented with 
studies using alternative methods. 
Despite these qualifications, some interesting results were obtained from 
the empirical analyses. For Britain and (western and eastern) Germany 
alike, the probability of multi-employer bargaining increases with the size 
of an establishment, which may reflect the advantage of falling transaction 
costs. Establishments operating in the public sector are more likely to 
make use of collective bargaining and are less likely to rely on individual 
regulation than other establishments – an effect that is particularly strong 
in Britain. In both countries, branch plants are more likely subject to 
multi-employer bargaining agreements than independent establishments, 
probably due to a spill-over effect from their parent company. In contrast, 
newly-founded establishments are more likely not to make use of collec-
tive bargaining, probably because they require more flexible institutional 
arrangements at this early stage of their existence or because they have 
not been organised yet by trade unions and employers' associations. 
The non-participation of new establishments and the increasing privatiza-
tion of companies in the public sector both imply that bargaining coverage 
will further decline over time, as has been the case in Britain and Ger-
many in the last decades. Due to data limitations, the determinants of 
changes in firms’ bargaining status have proved difficult to identify (see 
first attempts by Zagelmeyer, 2004a, for Britain and by Kohaut and 
Schnabel, 2003, for Germany). Further micro research employing future 
waves of both data sets should try to make better use of the panel char-
                                                
11 Two additional variables of interest (and suggested by a referee) would be the struc-
ture of the product market and union presence or strength within establishments. Un-
fortunately, information on these variables is not available in the data set for Ger-
many. Using the four cross-sectional WIRS/WERS datasets, research by Zagelmeyer 
(2004a) on the association between the demand of private sector employers for gov-
ernance structures on the one hand and (i) union density and/or (ii) geographical 
scope of the product market and/or (iii) the extent of competition does not yield any 
stable results over time. 
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acter of the data. Combined with macro research on bargaining coverage 
of the type employed, for instance, by Traxler et al. (2001) this should 
enable us to obtain a better insight into the determinants of changes in 
bargaining institutions and governance structures. 
Our finding that more or less the same set of variables are associated with 
firms’ choice of governance structure for the employment relationship in 
Britain and Germany is quite interesting since the institutional framework 
and the bargaining tradition in both countries differ markedly. We would 
not claim to have identified a common model which fits both countries 
perfectly or which could even be generalised to other countries. It might 
be interesting to see, however, to which degree these variables also play a 
role in other countries whose experiences in the coverage and evolution of 
collective bargaining may be totally different. While this is beyond the 
scope of the present study, more comparative research on the determi-
nants of collective bargaining structure, which should make use of micro- 
and macro-econometric analyses as well as case studies, is clearly 
needed. 
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Appendix 
 
Table: Definition and descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
Variable  Description and Coding  Sample N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Governance structure Categorical variable: Type of governance struc-
ture: 1 = no collective bargaining, 2 = single-
employer collective bargaining, 3 = multi-
employer collective bargaining 
Britain 
W. Germany 
E. Germany 
2,125 
8,006 
5,301 
1.65 
2.24 
1.85 
1.79 
0.94 
0.94 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
Establishment size Continuous variable: Total number of employ-
ees working at the establishment 
Britain 
W. Germany 
E. Germany 
2,125 
8,006 
5,301 
286.94 
242.15 
119.89 
851.91 
938.71 
313.89 
10 
1 
1 
28,971 
41,638 
5,715 
Establishment size 
squared 
Continuous variable: Total number of employ-
ees working at the establishment squared 
Britain 
W. Germany 
E. Germany 
2,125 
8,006 
5,301 
807746.9 
939697.4 
112563.0 
1.88e+07 
2.24e+07 
1001250 
100 
1 
1 
8.39e+08 
1.73e+09 
3.27e+07 
Branch plant Dummy variable: Establishment is part of a 
multi-establishment organisation = 1 
Britain 
W. Germany 
E. Germany 
2,125 
8,006 
5,301 
0.79 
0.22 
0.19 
0.40 
0.42 
0.39 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
Establishment age Dummy variable: Establishment has been op-
erating at this address for up to 5 years = 1 
Britain 
W. Germany 
E. Germany 
2,125 
8,006 
5,301 
0.16 
0.10 
0.17 
0.36 
0.30 
0.38 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
Low-skilled employ-
ees 
Continuous variable: Percentage of total rou-
tine unskilled manual workers or clerical and 
secretarial employees 
Britain 
W. Germany 
E. Germany 
2,125 
8,006 
5,301 
30.09 
26.77 
14.29 
26.43 
27.98 
23.09 
0 
0 
0 
100 
100 
100 
Foreign ownership/ 
control 
Dummy variable: Workplace is predominantly 
foreign owned (51 per cent or more) = 1  
Britain 
W. Germany 
E. Germany 
2,125 
8,006 
5,301 
0.10 
0.06 
0.02 
0.31 
0.25 
0.15 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
Public sector Dummy variable: Establishment is operating in 
the public sector = 1 
Britain 
W. Germany 
E. Germany 
2,125 
8,006 
5,301 
0.30 
0.16 
0.20 
0.46 
0.37 
0.40 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
Sources: WERS 98; IAB Establishment Panel 2000. 
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